One of the most controversial questions in current competition policy is when, if ever, should competition law require a …rm with market power to share its property, notably intellectual property, with its rivals? And if supply is required, on what terms? These questions are discussed with reference to recent law cases including the EC Microsoft judgment of 2007 and the US linkLine case of 2009. The analysis focuses on whether competition law and regulation are complements or substitutes, and on incentives for investment and (sequential) innovation.
copyright. In the far more important domain of computer software, refusal to supply information with IPR protection was a central question in the recent EC Microsoft case.
These examples illustrate that tension between competition principles and property right principles, as well as their intrinsic interest, are economic policy questions of the …rst order of importance. The fact that they are ultimately decided by courts makes them no less so. What then does economics have to say about them? Such questions are too large for comprehensive treatment, but in this lecture I will talk about aspects of two of the three points made by the Supreme Court in the quotation from the Trinko judgment above, namely those concerning investment incentives and regulation (courts as 'central planners'), leaving aside the further point about collusion.
With recent telecommunications network access cases in mind, the next section discusses whether competition law should regulate the terms on which rivals are granted access to an incumbent …rm's established network. In particular, should it count as an unlawful abuse of market power 3 for a vertically-integrated dominant …rm to set its retail and wholesale (network access) prices in such a way that there is a 'price squeeze'(sometimes called margin squeeze) against rivals? The US Supreme
Court's recent answer to this question is very di¤erent from the position taken by the European Courts. In part, the trans-Atlantic di¤erence is about deeper institutional questions: which authorities and processes are best placed to resolve access pricing issues, and does the presence of sector-speci…c regulation give more, or less, reason for competition law to apply?
Section 3 turns to dynamic analysis, and the question of how innovation investment incentives are a¤ected by required sharing of intellectual property. Recent economic analysis has challenged the conventional wisdom that stronger IP rights necessarily promote innovation, especially where follow-on innovation is concerned, and in some EC cases -above all Microsoft -the refusal to license intellectual property has been held to breach competition law. But wide-ranging competition law duties to share intellectual property would seem undesirable. How then to limit the circumstances in which they apply? The concluding section o¤ers a brief summary
Questions about the competition law duties, if any, of infrastructure owners to share their property with rivals are well illustrated by a string of major recent cases about the terms on which rivals may have access to the local networks of incumbent vertically-integrated telecommunications operators. The advent of broadband technology has heightened the importance of telecommunications network access, and in contexts where incumbent telecommunications network operators themselves wish to compete in the retail market for those services. Here is a classic example where rivals'ability to compete against the incumbent is strongly dependent on the terms on which they have access to the incumbent's infrastructure. In several European markets, moreover, the incumbent until relatively recently had statutory protection from competition, and a prior history of public ownership. For these reasons telecommunications markets tend to be quite heavily regulated, and regulation is a central feature of the cases to be discussed
The US Trinko case of 2004, cited above, concerned allegations that New York incumbent Verizon had, contrary to its regulatory duties, supplied local network services to rival local exchange carriers on an inadequate and discriminatory basis so as to put them at a competitive disadvantage. In February 2009 the Supreme Court gave judgment in another telecommunications case, called linkLine, 4 brought by Internet service providers against the Californian incumbent AT&T, where the issue was whether it can be a violation of US antitrust law for a vertically-integrated dominant …rm with wholesale market power to provide inputs to a rival on terms such that there is a price squeeze between the …rm's retail and wholesale prices. In neither case did any of the nine Supreme Court Justices …nd a violation of US antitrust law. should supply to its rival, Clear, access to the local networks that it monopolised.
The case was appealed all the way up to the Privy Council in London, which then had ultimate jurisdiction over NZ cases, and the Law Lords gave judgment in October 1994. In the absence of speci…c regulation, the matter came to be adjudicated under the provision of the NZ Commerce Act of 1986 that prohibited use of a dominant position for anti-competitive purposes. Baumol and Willig testi…ed on behalf of Telecom that it would not be 'using'its dominant position if it supplied access on terms that recovered the incremental cost of access plus the loss of pro…t from supplying access. This pricing principle is known as the e¢ cient component pricing rule (ECPR) or retail-minus rule. To the criticism that the ECPR, since it says nothing about price levels, could lock in monopoly pro…ts, the response was that was a matter for regulation, not competition law, which should focus on the question of competitive parity between the incumbent and rival in the contested retail activity. Their
Lordships agreed, …nding that the ECPR was a proper benchmark for what would happen in a competitive market, and that if there were monopoly pro…ts, which had not been demonstrated, there were price control provisions elsewhere in the Act.
A very simple price squeeze model
The cases just mentioned concern questions about refusal to supply (adequate) network access, about wholesale (i.e. network access) pricing, about predatory retail pricing, and about price squeeze (or, synonymously, margin squeeze) -i.e. the relationship between retail and wholesale prices. To begin the economic assessment of these issues it may be useful to have in mind a very simple model. that the rivals constitute a price-taking fringe, whose aggregate supply s(m) is therefore a strictly increasing function of the margin m p a between M's retail and access prices that s(c) > 0 so that some fringe supply is e¢ cient.
De…ne (m) (c m)s(m) as the pro…t/loss that M makes as a result of the fringe supplying s(m). On each unit of fringe supply M saves retail cost c, loses retail revenue p, but receives wholesale revenue a, and so (c m) net. Therefore M's overall
Note that for all p the pro…t-maximising marginm maximises (m) and som < c. Firm M squeezes rivals to extract some of their superior e¢ ciency, rather as in the asymmetric information model of Aghion and Bolton (1987) , where exclusive contract breach terms are constructed so as to have a chance of extracting some rival e¢ ciency advantage. However, productive e¢ ciency, and social welfare given However, this embracing of the as-e¢ cient competitor principle is not the same as tolerating all m c, because c is M's marginal cost in the retail activity, not average total cost, and it seems likely (also from other EC case law) that product-speci…c …xed as well as variable costs are to be taken into account in applying the price squeeze test.
The case is of wider importance because of what it says about the relationship between competition law and regulation. DT argued that no competition law breach should be found because the German regulatory authority for telecommunications, which imposed the access charges, had repeatedly examined price squeeze allegations 10 It follows from (1) that if M has the power to set p, then p varies with a according to dp da = 1 1+ 00 = 00 : 11 A very di¤erent approach from that of their Lordships in the NZ case was adopted by the UK Competition Appeal Tribunal (CAT) in the Welsh water case Dŵr Cymru v Albion. The case arose from a complaint by Albion, the …rst new entrant into the water industry after privatisation, that the incumbent, Dŵr Cymru, was refusing to transport water for Albion through its distribution network except at a price that was excessive, discriminatory and which gave rise to a margin squeeze -i.e. allowed Albion an insu¢ cient margin. Ofwat, the regulator, rejected the complaint in 2004 on the basis of an ECPR approach -i.e. by assessing the network access price by reference to the incumbent's retail price less costs that it avoids by granting access. Albion appealed to the CAT, which rejected the use of the ECPR approach and ruled that Dŵr Cymru had abused its dominant position by imposing a margin squeeze.
12 Deutsche Telekom v Commission, T-271/03 [2008] at paragraph 237, emphasis added.
and had not seen anti-competitive conduct. The CFI ruled in 2008 that DT could nevertheless in ‡uence its authorised charges by application to the regulator and so had su¢ cient scope to …x its charges so as to end or reduce the anti-competitive e¤ects, and that the European Commission could not be bound by the view of a national regulator on the application of EC competition law. DT has appealed to the European Court of Justice.
The US Supreme Court has taken an altogether di¤erent view of such matters.
In the Trinko case, the question was whether Verizon's alleged breach of its regulatory duty to share its network with rivals gave rise to a claim under antitrust (= competition) law. The regulatory statute, the Telecommunications Act of 1996, stated explicitly that antitrust law was not disapplied. The Supreme Court held that, although Verizon had a regulatory duty to share its network with rivals, that did not give rise to an antitrust law duty under prevailing antitrust law standards, and traditional antitrust principles did not create a case for adding a new exception to the normal principle that there is no duty to aid rivals. Moreover, a …rm with no antitrust duty to deal with its rivals had no obligation to supply an 'adequate'level of service if it did deal with them.
To arrive at this result the Court had to distinguish the facts of Trinko from those of the 1985 case of Aspen Skiing (or else explicitly over-rule Aspen), in which an operator of ski facilities was held to have breached antitrust law by pulling out of a joint ticketing scheme with another ski operator, Highlands. 13 The Court considered
Aspen to be 'at or near the outer boundary'of antitrust liability and distinguished
Trinko on several grounds. Aspen had terminated long-standing voluntary dealings with Highlands, perhaps suggesting that the cessation of supply was anti-competitive, whereas Verizon had not willingly shared its property with rivals. Moreover, Aspen had refused to deal with Highlands even at retail prices, whereas the Verizon service at issue was not supplied at retail at all, but was only required to be supplied by regulation. The Court attached particular importance to the fact that Verizon, unlike
Aspen, was subject to a regulatory structure designed to deter and remedy anticompetitive harm:
'Where such a structure exists, the additional bene…t to competition provided by antitrust enforcement will tend to be small, and it will be less plausible that the antitrust laws contemplate such additional scrutiny.
Where, by contrast, " [t] here is nothing built into the regulatory scheme which performs the antitrust function", ... the bene…ts of antitrust are worth its sometimes considerable disadvantages.'
With regulation present, therefore, the balance of risk as between false positives and false negatives was viewed as a factor counting against antitrust liability, and the courts were anyway seen as being much less capable than regulators at supervising the terms of duties to deal.
14 The presence of regulation was the principal reason why four of the nine Supreme
Court Justices in the linkLine case held, agreeing with the other …ve, that the plainti¤s could not bring a price-squeeze claim against AT&T under antitrust law. In Justice Breyer's opinion, the plainti¤s, rather than seeking to invoke antitrust law, could have gone to the regulator and petitioned for the regulated wholesale prices to be reduced. The reasoning of the majority of …ve Justices was however on di¤erent lines. First, from Trinko it followed that the terms of wholesale access (a in the model) could not be challenged because AT&T did not have a duty under antitrust law -as distinct from regulation -to supply at wholesale at all. Second, a claim that AT&T's retail price p violated antitrust law by virtue of being too low would have to meet the standard for predatory pricing established by the Supreme Court in the 1993
Brooke Group case, which requires proof that price is below an appropriate measure of cost and also that there is a 'dangerous probability of recoupment'. 15 Third, if a and p were independently lawful, their relationship to one another could not give rise to an antitrust violation. Ergo, price squeeze was not itself a breach of antitrust law, at least in the absence of an antitrust duty to deal at wholesale. The case was sent back to the District Court for assessment of whether a predatory pricing claim can 14 This is not to say that regulation generally gets things right. Caution about the application of antitrust might also be warranted if regulatory duties were seen as unduly favourable to rivals to begin with.
15 Brooke Group Ltd v Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp, 509 U. S. 209 (1993) . A major di¤erence between US and EC law on predatory pricing, con…rmed by the European Court of Justice in its Wanadoo judgment of April 2009, is that in EC law 'demonstrating that it is possible to recoup losses is not a necessary precondition for a …nding of predatory pricing'. be brought instead. 16 An interesting economic question is what measure of cost should be used in such an assessment of predatory pricing. In terms of the notation above, the direct marginal cost of supplying a retail unit is C. But the opportunity cost rationale for the ECPR approach to access pricing suggests that [a (C c)] should be added, since that is the lost wholesale pro…t if M competes a unit of retail business away from rivals. On that view the relevant overall measure of cost is (a + c). But the condition p a + c is just the same as m c. The cost test element of the predatory pricing assessment on this basis would be just the same as the ECPR. The Court however stated, in e¤ect, that if a and p are 'independently lawful, there is no basis for imposing antitrust liability simply because'a p.
17 This and other judicial statements suggest that opportunity cost is unlikely to be included in the relevant measure of cost for predatory pricing assessment.
It will be apparent from this discussion that the EC and US courts have viewed not only price squeeze cases very di¤erently -the contrast between the recent cases of Deutsche Telekom and linkLine is especially striking -but also the wider relationship between antitrust and sector-speci…c regulation. Whereas the US Supreme Court has cautioned against the use of antitrust in regulated industries, in the UK and elsewhere in Europe the applicability of competition law in regulated industries -where, after all, a considerable proportion of dominant …rms are to be found -has been seen as positively desirable, not least as a facilitator of the removal of ex ante regulation.
This contrast must however be seen in the context of important institutional di¤erences as between the US and Europe. The forum for US antitrust is the courts. relating to mergers) concurrently with the OFT. The competition law decisions of public authorities in Europe are subject to appeal to the courts -to the CFI in the case of the European Commission and to the Competition Appeal Tribunal for OFT decisions -but the European system of administrative decision subject to judicial scrutiny is very di¤erent from the US system of judicial decision-making. Private competition litigation in Europe is still comparatively rare. There is no trebling of damages, and lobbying public authorities is often favoured by private parties over pursuing litigation. Such private actions as occur in Europe are typically follow-on damages cases after a public authority has established a competition law violation, or arise out of contract or patent infringement disputes. Another important transAtlantic di¤erence is that many regulated dominant …rms in Europe were until quite recently state-owned monopolies.
These institutional di¤erences have some bearing on the points made by the Supreme Court in Trinko. Where infrastructure is the product of years of public investment, incentive considerations may weigh less heavily against required sharing than if private risk capital has …nanced the assets. But as time passes after privatisation, this point loses force. Moreover, the competition rules apply generally, and are not contingent on ownership or regulatory history. As to the 'central planners' point, administrative authorities, albeit subject to the courts, may be somewhat less ill-suited than the courts to identify and monitor terms of required dealing, though if judicial control is to be e¤ective, the courts are necessarily involved. Moreover, the law is the same whether a decision is made by a public authority or a case is brought by a private party, in which case the forum is the court anyway.
It is also worth noting two arguments that regulation gives more, not less, reason to apply competition law to refusal to supply cases. First, in regulated industries, unlike elsewhere, there is typically a duty to deal in the …rst place. Thus there is some irony in the fact that the Supreme Court found an antitrust duty to deal in the case of ski slopes but not telecommunications networks. Second, the presence of regulation is one reason why the Chicago School 'one monopoly pro…t'argument for scepticism about leverage claims may not apply. Finally, whatever may be the position in law, there is an interesting economic question whether terms of dealing (e.g. a price squeeze) can be anti-competitively exclusionary only if a blank refusal to supply would be too.
'Unfortunately, the e¤ects of antitrust policy on innovation are poorly understood.' 18 Some of the sharpest dilemmas about the intrusion of competition policy into property rights concern intellectual property -patents, copyright and business secrets.
Intellectual property di¤ers in several economic respects from physical property. One is that an important part of the justi…cation for physical property rights is that use of physical property is rivalrous. If I eat your lunch you can't eat it too. My eating it reduces your opportunities. Intellectual 'property'is by contrast non-rivalrous. If I use your idea you can use it anyway. My using it does not limit your opportunities.
The case for IP protection therefore primarily has to do with incentives to develop IP.
19
The orthodox (and often correct) position is that stronger IPRs, including laissezfaire competition policy towards the exercise of IPRs, are good for innovation because they increase the value of the prize to the winner of the contest to innovate. Virtually any one-shot model of innovation will yield that result. Of course it does not follow, even in such models, that stronger IPRs are necessarily welfare-improving, not least because the strengthening of IPRs may come at the cost of greater 'static' welfare losses via greater monopoly power, as examined in the long-established literature on patent length and breadth. But intuition based on one-shot models of innovation still cautions against weakening IPRs, whether by competition law restrictions or otherwise.
Matters are much less straightforward, however, when dynamic rivalry takes the form of a sequence of competitions to innovate, because the factors that determine the value of one innovation -for example, whether in some circumstances it must be licensed to rivals -may in ‡uence conditions of competition for the subsequent 18 Segal and Whinston (2007, page 1703) . 19 But not quite entirely. While important consumer bene…ts would ‡ow from Mickey Mouse being freely in the public domain, he might then be exploited in ways that tarnished his reputation to public detriment. The economic arguments are nevertheless overwhelmingly against retrospective extension of copyright protection, which obviously has zero incentive e¤ect.
(e.g. complementary) innovations. Such dynamic linkages can strengthen the orthodox position if hastening the next innovation tends also to accelerate the arrival of succeeding advances. But in a number of settings the e¤ect can be the opposite: stronger IPR protection for the next advance might blunt, or even block, subsequent innovative e¤ort. Thus the European Commission took the view that Microsoft's refusal to supply inter-operability information to rival suppliers of server operating system software had a negative e¤ect on innovation to the detriment of consumers.
The front-loading e¤ect
To see more clearly how dynamic considerations can weaken (or strengthen) the orthodox position that strong and unconstrained IPRs are good for innovation incentives, consider three related models of R&D competition when there is sequential innovation. First, the Segal and Whinston (2007) analysis of antitrust in innovative industries focuses on policies that restrict incumbent behaviour towards new entrants.
Such policies are double-edged. A potential entrant is helped by protection from the incumbent, but the incentive to displace him is at the same time diminished by reduction in the value of incumbency. Segal and Whinston's examination of the net e¤ect of these con ‡icting forces emphasises the front-loading e¤ect.
Speci…cally, in their deliberately stylized basic model where only the challenger does R&D, when the current incumbent monopolist is confronted by an innovating rival, the rival is assumed to become the incumbent monopolist after an interval of time, during which the two …rms compete. Consider varying the pro…t split between the two …rms during that duopoly phase while holding constant their joint pro…t. For example, if the rival had to pay a lump-sum licence fee f to the erstwhile monopolist, the level of f would a¤ect the pro…t split but not joint pro…t. Stronger IP rights would favour a division of joint pro…t that favoured the original incumbent, so higher rather than lower f . But Segal and Whinston show that the innovation incentives of the challenger are greater when the incumbent has a lower pro…t share in the duopoly phase. Higher f increases the value of being a monopolist because it increases the pro…t of the monopolist once it is displaced in the possibly distant future, but it decreases by the same amount the nearer-term pro…t of an innovating challenger.
Time discounting makes the near-term e¤ect more important -hence the 'front-loading'tag.
Thus pro…t shifts from entrant to incumbent in the duopoly phase discourage innovation because of the front-loading e¤ect. Insofar as it protects against undue reduction of entrant pro…t by incumbent behaviour, competition policy can safeguard innovation incentives. So laissez-faire towards the incumbent, even though that maximises the value of incumbency, does not necessarily maximise innovation incentives.
The neck-and-neck e¤ect
A second and separate reason why innovation is not necessarily maximised by stronger IP rights and unconstrained market leadership has to do with the fact that R&D rivalry may be more intense when …rms are neck-and-neck rather than asymmetrically placed. Following Aghion et al (2001) assume as before that there are two …rms in the market and that the current pro…t ‡ow n of a …rm depends on the number n of technology 'steps'that it is ahead of its rival (or behind if n < 0). 20 This formulation, in which pro…t depends on relative technology levels, is consistent with special cases of various models of cost reduction or 'quality ladder' competition. Suppose for simplicity that a …rm cannot get more than one step ahead, perhaps because its rival then would get its previous technology for free. Let the ‡ow cost of advancing from a level position into the lead with Poisson probability rate x be c(x), and let the ‡ow cost of catching up from behind with probability rate y + h be c(y). That is to say, when …rms are level, expenditure at rate c(x) gives rise to probability x:dt that an advance will be made in small time interval dt, and for a …rm that is behind, expenditure at rate y gives rise to probability (y + h)dt of catch-up in that small interval. So there is catch-up at probability rate h 0 even if the follower does no R&D, and h is therefore a measure of the weakness of IPRs.
It is natural to assume that neck-and-neck product market competition is more intense, so that 2 0 1 + 1 . It follows that x > y, so both …rms make more innovative e¤ort when …rms are level than the laggard does otherwise. Both x and y are decreasing in h, so increasing with the strength of IPRs as is conventional. But (y + h) could well be increasing in h. This last fact gives rise to the possibility that weaker IPRs in the sense of higher h can promote rather than retard innovation. Let be the proportion of the time that …rms in the industry are neck-and-neck. 21 In steady-state the probabilities of entering and exiting that state are equal, so that
Moreover, the rate g at which the technology frontier advances on average is also equal to 2 x, because the frontier advances only when …rms are level, which is of the time, and when the …rms are level the chance that one or other will make an advance in the next short interval of time is proportional to 2x. From (2) it follows
Increasing h therefore has ambiguous e¤ects on g. In keeping with the orthodox view of IPRs, it weakens the incentive to get ahead, but it also increases the proportion of time that …rms are competing neck-and-neck to advance the technological fron-
tier. The overall e¤ect is ambiguous. If h is not too large, then g increases with h
because the increased amount of neck-and-neck competition outweighs the blunting of incentives to get ahead. But beyond a certain point, g declines with h in orthodox fashion.
Again we see that, in a sequential setting, bolstering the prize for innovating need not boost innovation. There is a composition e¤ect -if …rms compete hardest to innovate when neck-and-neck, then reducing the prize for innovating may nevertheless promote innovation if it increases the proportion of neck-and-neck competition.
Follow-on innovation
An entirely distinct reason why stronger IPRs might not promote innovation has to do with sequential complementary innovations -in short, follow-on innovations. This issue is highlighted in the European Commission's recent guidance on exclusionary abuse:
"The Commission considers that consumer harm may, for instance, arise where the competitors that the dominant undertaking forecloses are, as a result of the refusal, prevented from bringing innovative goods or services 21 In the growth model of Aghion et al (2001) there is a continuum of industries and is the proportion of them that are neck-and-neck at a given time.
to market and/or where follow-on innovation is likely to be sti ‡ed. ... The Commission will consider claims by the dominant undertaking that a refusal to supply is necessary to allow the dominant undertaking to realise an adequate return on the investments required to develop its input business, thus generating incentives to continue to invest in the future, taking the risk of failed projects into account. The Commission will also consider claims by the dominant undertaking that its own innovation will be negatively a¤ected by the obligation to supply, or by the structural changes in the market conditions that imposing such an obligation will bring about, including the development of follow-on innovation by competitors." conversely, a new product may require several prior innovations as inputs; or (iii) it could be that each product is an improvement on its predecessor (as in the Segal and Whinston model discussed above). Simple models of types (i) and (iii) will be developed shortly.
The incentive problem emphasised in the in ‡uential paper by Green and Scotchmer (1995) , which has two stages of innovation, is how to give enough reward to the …rst innovator, without whose breakthrough the follow-on innovation cannot happen, while preserving incentives for the development of the second innovation if that is e¢ cient. Giving the …rst innovator su¢ ciently broad IP rights that the second innovation cannot be implemented without a licence from the …rst innovator enhances the incentive for the …rst innovation but dims the incentive for independent innovators to achieve the follow-on innovation. (The …rst innovator could attempt the second innovation too but others might well be better placed or have independent routes to it.) This issue is explored by Bessen and Maskin (2006) , but the illustrative model plementary to fundamental innovations. Incentives for both kinds of innovation will depend on the terms on which fundamental innovators allow follow-on innovators to have access to their fundamental technologies.
To examine this question, assume that a particular fundamental innovation has been achieved, and suppose that there is an in…nite sequence of potential followon innovations -or improvements -each of social net present value v. Assume that improvement n + 1 is possible only once innovation n has been made, so that improvements are sequential, and that the next improvement neither enhances nor diminishes the value of prior ones. Suppose again that the Poisson arrival rate x for the next innovation has ‡ow cost c(x), and that the discount rate is r > 0. Two …rms compete to make improvements -…rm 1, the fundamental innovator, and …rm 2.
Suppose that …rm 1 gets a payo¤ equal to v (i.e. exactly the social value) whenever it makes an improvement to its fundamental innovation and a licence fee of v whenever …rm 2 does, while …rm 2 gets (1 )v for each improvement that it makes. Thus is the split of value v whenever …rm 2 makes an improvement.
Let x and y respectively be the symmetric Markov equilibrium strategies of …rms 1 and 2. Let A and B be the value functions for the …rms. Then
and equilibrium x is simply given by
for all and y. The RHS of (4) re ‡ects that in small time interval dt there is probability x:dt of …rm 1 innovating, in which case it gets v, and probability y:dt of …rm 2 innovating, in which case …rm 1 gets v. Likewise, for …rm 2
with equilibrium y given by
In the simplest quadratic case with c(x) = 1 2
and
The maker of the fundamental innovation would maximize its value, in this example, by pre-committing to a licence fee of v = v 2
, with the result that rA = . The welfare-maximizing licence fee to commit to ex ante is nevertheless lower, as it balances incentives to make improvements against incentives to make fundamental innovations.
A model so simple as this could be extended and varied in all sorts of ways. With exclusionary conduct in mind, consider the following adaptation. Suppose, in the spirit of Carlton and Waldman (2002) and Choi and Stefanadis (2001) , that each time that …rm 2 makes a follow-on innovation, there is probability > 0 that …rm 1's fundamental innovation will be displaced altogether. The idea here is that rival fundamental innovators have more chance of getting established when the independent …rm 2, rather than …rm 1, controls complementary technology. (Thus the threat to the dominance of the Windows operating system might have been greater had independent Netscape ‡ourished.) The …rst-order conditions (5) and (6) do not change but (4) and (7) . If on the other hand < 1, then the optimal for …rm 1 to pre-commit to is
This re ‡ects both a degree of exploitation of the value of follow-on innovations by …rm 2 and defence of monopoly of the fundamental innovation. The latter 'defensive leverage'is not aimed at adding a second monopoly to the core monopoly but rather, consistent with the 'one monopoly pro…t'argument, at maintaining the core monopoly. (For the same reason, …rm 1 would command a high licence fee in bargaining ex post if …rm 2 made a follow-on innovation without the licence fee having been set in advance.) Firm 1 will want to set the licence fee higher than is socially optimal. A small reduction in below ( ) will have a second-order e¤ect on A and therefore upon the reward for fundamental innovation, but positive …rst-order e¤ects on others. Requiring that = 0 has mixed welfare e¤ects because it substantially reduces the value of fundamental innovation.
The situation with = 0, or something like it, could result in two broad ways.
The …rst is if …rm 1's intellectual property rights over the fundamental innovation were narrow so that it could not block -and so could not get licence fees for -the implementation of follow-on innovation by other …rms. There is indeed a strong case to be made that some important IPRs are too broad. 23 Second, and the concern of this paper, is that competition law mandates licensing at low fees. Even for a believer that IPRs are often too broad, however, there is good reason for caution before taking this second step since the right to exclude is the core of property rights and should not lightly be trumped. There was much argument over the signi…cance of these two cases, which both involved odd IP rights, in the Microsoft appeal. Microsoft argued that the circumstances of its refusal to supply interoperability information were well outside IMS Health criteria. The Commission recognised that their automatic application might be problematic and urged the Court to look at the entirety of the circumstances, and various special factors including the facts that here was a hugely important proprietary de facto software standard, and that the refusal involved a disruption of previous supplies (recall Aspen). The Commission in its decision had also taken care to consider innovation incentives and to address the 'one monopoly pro…t'argument, noting that by strengthening its dominance in the workgroup server operating systems market Microsoft reinforced its dominance in the PC operating systems. In the event, however, the Court found easily in favour of the Commission on the IMS Health criteria, which it interpreted surprisingly elastically, and without relying on 
The Microsoft cases

Conclusions
The question posed at the outset did not just ask when …rms with market power should be required to share their property with rivals, but also when (if ever) such requirements should come from competition law. A comprehensive answer would therefore examine the comparative institutional advantages of competition law relative to other means of policy intervention, as well as the desirability or otherwise of required sharing of property. This lecture has not attempted such an answer but I hope it has shown that there is a real and important issue here. That is itself indicated by the contrasting approaches to the sharing of both network infrastructure and intellectual property rights taken by the US and EC courts in recent competition law cases. Di¤erences in the institutions of competition law enforcement -the court-based system in the US compared with the primarily administrative system in Europe, subject to appeal to the courts -may explain some of the di¤erence of approach, but not all.
Despite broad trans-Atlantic convergence of other elements of competition policymergers and anti-competitive agreements -the ocean remains wide as regards single…rm abuse of market power, with many of us ‡oating somewhere in the middle. So, for example, the importation to Europe of the antitrust conservatism shown by the Supreme Court in Trinko and linkLine would in my view be unwelcome, at least if EC competition law is reasonably disciplined in application, not least by economics.
As a general matter, regulated dominant …rms in Europe have often been unduly shielded from the disciplines of both competition and competition law, while at the same time being over-regulated. The application of competition law, although far from perfect, is less prone than regulation to sector-speci…c capture (whether by vested or political interests), is not monopolised by the regulator, and can facilitate desirable deregulation. The fact that regulated dominant …rms often have regulatory duties to supply wholesale services to rivals may give less, not more, reason to be concerned about using competition law to ensure that such supplies are not made on anti-competitive terms, which can include price squeezes in some circumstances.
However, EC competition law is not always disciplined in application, nor adequately informed by economics, especially in relation to the analysis of abuse of dominance. The ease by which the Court of First Instance upheld the Commission's decision against Microsoft is but one illustration of this concern. It has been said that competition policy 'is a form of regulation that competes with other regulatory structures'. 28 Economists, working with lawyers, can help make it a more e¢ cient competitor.
28 Federal Trade Commission Chairman Muris at the meeting of the International Competition Network, Naples, September 2002.
